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FEATURE
DO NO HARM: THE CHALLENGE OF 
PROTECTING CIVILIANS FROM THE IED 
THREAT IN SOUTH-CENTRAL SOMALIA
By Abigail Jones [ Danish Refugee Council / Danish Demining Group ]
In many countries, improvised explosive devices (IED), in-cluding improvised landmines, now constitute more of a threat to civilians than factory-manufactured landmines 
and other conventional weapons. The Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2016 reported that the total number of ca-
sualties from victim-operated IEDs, which act in a similar 
manner to anti-personnel mines, increased from 1,075 in 2014 
to 1,331 in 2015, the highest annual total of IED casualties re-
corded since 1999.1 In response to this, humanitarian mine 
action organizations are expanding their scope of activities 
to include IED awareness for civilians either as a stand-alone 
activity or by integrating messages on IEDs into traditional 
mine risk education (MRE) sessions. This article explores the 
protection concerns related to the conduct of any educational 
activities on IEDs, with a particular focus on south-central 
Somalia. The article also discusses the challenges that exist 
for humanitarian organizations to successfully plan and im-
plement IED awareness while upholding the principle of “do 
no harm.” Furthermore, the article argues that there is a need 
to recognize that educational activities related to IEDs must 
be approached with methodologies, messages, and materials 
specific to these devices, as opposed to simply copying those 
that are considered to be effective for MRE.   
Importance of Risk Assessments 
As is the case with MRE, IED awareness should aim to 
reduce civilian casualties. However, a thorough risk assess-
ment is the first step in identifying the realistic benefits of 
IED awareness and ensuring that they significantly outweigh 
the potential associated risks. This is due to the fact that IED 
awareness has the potential to create serious protection issues 
for the civilian population, many of which are outlined in the 
rest of the article. There is also a risk that organizations will 
be seen as taking sides in the conflict. Therefore, a thorough 
risk assessment is a key decision-making tool to help organi-
zations understand the status of the device, the typical target, 
the common scenarios of use, and the implications of imple-
menting IED awareness for both the civilian population and 
the organization itself.2 However, the risk assessment should 
also present concrete risk-mitigation strategies. Moreover, due 
to the complexities created by dynamic conflicts, risk assess-
ments need to be made at regional or local levels in order to 
be relevant. The Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining 
Group (DRC/DDG) has designed such a risk assessment pro-
cess that is proposed as a framework for the drafting of a 
Technical Note on Mine Action in support of references to 
IEDs within International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
Analysis of the Situation in South-Central Somalia
In south-central Somalia, IEDs are actively being deployed 
by armed opposition groups, such as Harakaat al-Shabaab 
al-Mujaahidiin, as well as by criminal gangs and during inter- 
\militant conflict.3 These weapons bring the time, place, and 
method of attack fully under the operator’s control, hence 
the high prevalence of use. There are very few cases of lega-
cy devices because unused devices that did not detonate are 
typically retrieved and employed elsewhere.4 Humanitarian 
organizations looking into the feasibility of conducting IED 
awareness in south-central Somalia should be cognizant of the 
fact that, in this context, IEDs are not the after-effects of con-
flict but a tool actively used by armed opposition groups to 
destabilize and attack the state.5 Any organization getting in-
volved in this issue, regardless of altruistic intentions, risks 
being perceived as siding with one party to the conflict over 
the other, and could therefore become a target for al-Shabaab 
or other IED users. 
Data available from January to July 2016 demonstrates that 
40 percent of IED attacks in south-central Somalia during 
this period involved command-detonated IEDs, four percent 
were victim-operated IEDs (VOIED), and 56 percent were un-
known. The high percentage of devices listed as unknown is 
due to the challenges posed to carrying out post-blast forensic 
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investigations at the explosion sites, and it also highlights the 
difficulty of compiling accurate data on types of IEDs used. 
It should be noted that Somalia is following the IEDs evolu-
tion trend, as was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, with predict-
able increases in device complexity and explosive charge size.6 
However, Somalia is distinct from other countries due to the 
fact that a significant proportion of IEDs encountered in those 
countries are VOIEDs. 
Overwhelmingly, IED attacks in south-central Somalia tar-
get government agencies and representatives such as security 
personnel or government officials. The majority of IED at-
tacks target locations where government or security service 
personnel work, such as the July 2016 attack on the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) building in Mogadishu, and 
the two attacks on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu where the 
government often hosts major conferences.7 Incidents involv-
ing high-profile targets are typically complex attacks where 
vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED) or suicide VBIEDs (SVBIED) are 
used to initiate the attack, which is immediately followed by 
gunmen who wear suicide vests, also known as person-borne 
IEDs (PBIED). Complex attacks are also a tactic to intimidate 
the local population by showing that al-Shabaab can strike 
wherever and whenever they like, including in areas that are 
officially under the control of the Federal Government of 
Somalia. In addition, roadside IEDs are used to target mili-
tary and police convoys, such as when a remote-controlled 
IED (RCIED) exploded as a police vehicle passed it near the 
Black Sea neighborhood in Mogadishu on 11 November 2016.8 
Armed opposition groups (AOG) commonly use IEDs to 
target representatives of the international community, partic-
ularly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the 
United Nations, and other representatives of the diplomatic 
community. In these cases, they are targeted because they are 
perceived as supporting the Federal Government of Somalia 
and therefore are not considered to have a neutral or impar-
tial status, or—in the case of AMISOM—because they active-
ly engaged in combat against al-Shabaab. A recent example is 
an attack that targeted AMISON troops in El-Ade in January 
2016. The incident began with the detonation of a VBIED fol-
lowed by al-Shabaab fighters storming the base.9 Additionally, 
twin VBIED attacks were carried out near the airport in 
Mogadishu in July 2016 and reportedly killed ten people; the 
attack was claimed by the spokesperson of al-Shabaab to have 
targeted the headquarters of the African Union force.10  
In 2015, there were 887 IED casualties in south-central 
Somalia, 454 (51 percent) of which were civilians.11 Research 
indicates that in the majority of cases, civilian casualties are 







Figure 1. 2016 IED snapshot: South-central Somalia.
Figure courtesy of the author.
The Ambassador Hotel.
All photos courtesy of UNMAS Somalia.
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initial blast or during the subsequent armed attack, such as 
when a roadside IED near Lafole town killed 18 civilians trav-
eling in a mini-bus that was escorted by a vehicle carrying 
government troops.12 In addition, there are increasing exam-
ples of deliberate attacks on public places that are considered 
too western and liberal, such as the three attacks on restau-
rants at Lido Beach in Mogadishu in 2016.
Gathering Information for IED Awareness
With civilians in south-central Somalia representing 51 
percent of the casualties from IEDs in 2015, the protection 
implications of this are significant in Somalia. There is cer-
tainly a strong argument for further research into what could 
be done to provide civilians with the knowledge and skills to 
avoid being caught up in an IED attack. While many recog-
nize that designing and implementing an effective education-
al program requires a thorough needs assessment to make 
informed programming decisions, this is problematic in the 
case of IED awareness.13 There are many risks associated with 
data-gathering on an active IED threat that do not apply to 
factory-manufactured mines or explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). This raises important questions from a protection 
perspective. 
In the context of south-central Somalia, information gath-
ering on vulnerabilities at the community level to an active 
IED threat is extremely sensitive and likely to be perceived 
by the local population as intelligence gathering on behalf of 
government or security forces. The perception that humani-
tarian organizations are affiliated with the government would 
call into question the neutrality and impartiality of the hu-
manitarian organization involved and could result in the 
organization and its staff being considered as legitimate tar-
gets for attack by AOGs. Humanitarian organizations should 
also be sensitive to the fact that, at this point, the IED threat 
in south-central Somalia is dealt with almost exclusively by 
state entities, which include the police, military, and intelli-
gence services. Consequently, despite altruistic and protective 
intentions, efforts by international organizations to gather 
information on these issues are likely to be treated with sus-
picion and even hostility by state actors.14 At the community 
level, anyone who is known or suspected to have provided in-
formation as part of such an assessment could be viewed as an 
informant. Considering that IED facilitators, as well as silent 
supporters of al-Shabaab live within the communities, there 
is a very real threat of retribution at the community level.15 
This analysis raises questions on whether it is possible to 
carry out information gathering on IEDs in south-central 
Somalia while upholding the principle of “do no harm.” In 
this context, DRC/DDG believes that employing participatory 
approaches to needs assessments—for example carrying out 
key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and indi-
vidual interviews with members of affected communities—has 
the potential to do great harm not only to the humanitarian 
organization but also to the beneficiary community. Hence, 
developing new methodologies and tools for analyzing the 
vulnerabilities of the civilian population to IEDs is prudent, 
and mine action organizations should avoid relying on those 
that have been used for traditional MRE needs assessments.
Implementing the IED Risk Education 
Awareness Campaign
If moving forward with an IED awareness campaign, orga-
nizations would do well to approach south-central Somalia’s 
situation with methodologies, messages, and materials that 
are specific to IEDs as opposed to those that are effective for 
traditional MRE.16 First and foremost, pictures of IEDs serve 
little purpose due to the fact that the manner in which IEDs 
are deployed implies that they remain hidden or disguised. If 
information regarding the appearance of IEDs or the context 
The Nasa Hablood Hotel.
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where they are placed is disseminated in communities, the 
groups that fabricate these weapons will potentially react by 
changing the devices’ appearance, components, and locations. 
Another risk involved in using pictures of IEDs is that every-
thing could potentially look like an IED. This would inevitably 
contribute to an unnecessary fear of everyday objects among 
the civilian population and intensify the psychological suffer-
ing already experienced by the Somali population.
Similarly, while significant work was done to develop 
IED awareness curricula for military personnel deployed in 
conf lict-affected environments, this information may not 
be appropriate for civilian audiences. For military person-
nel, IED awareness may delve into detail of how an IED is 
constructed and deployed, which is intended to supplement 
what they know about tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
This is reminiscent of the early days of mine action, when 
beneficiaries were provided with irrelevant information, 
e.g., the name of the weapon, the amount of explosive inside, 
and the functioning principle by which the mine operated. 
In the case of landmines and ERW, these unnecessary de-
tails were eventually deemed inappropriate and discarded. 
However, at this stage, the humanitarian community pres-
ently runs the risk of repeating the same mistakes in ad-
dressing IED-related threats.
Humanitarian organizations who share this level of detail 
with civilian audiences in south-central Somalia may inad-
vertently encourage people to approach suspected IEDs or, 
worse still, try to move them to protect others.17 Moreover, 
experience from counter-IED efforts illustrate that IED us-
ers regularly adapt their emplacement or targeting methods 
to thwart counter-IED measures.18 The implication of this for 
IED awareness is that materials and messages could quickly 
become irrelevant as the nature of IEDs evolve. Finally, if hu-
manitarian organizations are seen disseminating information 
on how to make IEDs and how they work at the community-
level, serious questions may be asked by the host government 
as to the purpose of educating people on this.
All educational activities on IEDs for civilians in south-
central Somalia should therefore focus on what the civilian 
population needs to know, which is distinctly different from 
that of military personnel. IED awareness at the community- 
level must emphasize improving situational awareness and 
the ability to recognize the IED indicators as well as those 
of an imminent attack. Depending on the results of the risk 
assessment, sessions could elaborate on the typical scenari-
os in which civilians become casualties and on what to do if 
civilians come across a suspected IED, are in the proximity of 
an explosion, or are caught in gunfire following an explosion. 
Asking the civilian population to “report” IEDs in a context 
like south-central Somalia is inappropriate. 
Looking Toward the Future
This article (1) explores the concerns relating to any edu-
cational activities on IEDs for the civilian population, with 
a particular focus on south-central Somalia. This article also 
discusses (2) the challenges that exist for humanitarian or-
ganizations wishing to plan and implement IED awareness 
successfully whilst upholding the principle of “do no harm.” 
Furthermore, the article argues that (3) there is a need to rec-
ognize that civilian-focused educational activities on IEDs 
must be approached with methodologies, materials, and mes-
sages specific to these devices. 
The case of south-central Somalia is used to highlight the 
fact that despite the high number of civilian casualties and the 
altruistic intentions behind engaging in IED awareness, if ap-
propriate risk-mitigation strategies are not in place, related 
activities have the potential to do real and long-lasting harm 
to organizations and beneficiaries. As a result, supplementing 
the necessary tools and best practices in dealing with IEDs is 
vital for the safety and effectiveness of mine action work in 
current conflict environments. A new Technical Note on 
Mine Action is a sound first step in this direction; however, to 
ensure that they “do no harm” the issue will require organiza-
tions to proceed with caution. 
See endnotes page 64
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